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Abstract. An important goal in the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) is to provide driving aids 
aimed at preventing accidents and reducing the number of traffic victims. The commonest traffic accidents in urban 
areas are due to sudden braking that demands a very fast response on the part of drivers. Attempts to solve this prob-
lem have motivated many ITS advances including the detection of the intention of surrounding cars using lasers, ra-
dars or cameras. However, this might not be enough to increase safety when there is a danger of collision. Vehicle to 
vehicle communications are needed to ensure that the other intentions of cars are also available. The article describes 
the development of a controller to perform an emergency stop via an electro-hydraulic braking system employed on 
dry asphalt. An original V2V communication scheme based on WiFi cards has been used for broadcasting positioning 
information to other vehicles. The reliability of the scheme has been theoretically analyzed to estimate its performance 
when the number of vehicles involved is much higher. This controller has been incorporated into the AUTOPIA pro-
gram control for automatic cars. The system has been implemented in Citroen C3 Pluriel, and various tests were per-
formed to evaluate its operation. 
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1. Introduction 
The trend towards future road transport is a move from 
simple driving aids to automatic driving controls. The 
goal is to attempt to reduce the number of collisions, 
or at least to mitigate their consequences (Prentkovskis 
et al. 2010a, 2010b; Sokolovskij et al. 2007; Cerniauskas 
et al. 2010). Factors such as poor visibility of other us-
ers, not maintaining a safe distance, or ignoring traffic 
signals are some of the main causes of accidents (Use 
of Intelligent... 2006). Most of these causes can be as-
sociated with excessive or inappropriate speed. In fact, a 
third of fatal or serious accidents are due to this reason. 
Considering different solutions to the above proposed 
problems, the development of autonomous vehicles is a 
particularly open field of discussions today. 
Research on developing automated vehicles to im-
prove the safety and efficiency of highways or freeways 
is indeed one of the most extensively studied topics 
in the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) 
that can be divided into two areas one of which is cen-
tred on roadway infrastructure, and its primary aim is 
to add information and communications technology 
to make driving easier (Junevicius, Bogdevicius 2009; 
Cah§kanelli et al. 2009; Boumediene et al. 2009). The 
other is centred on vehicles, and its goal is to develop 
driving assistance that reduces dependence on the driver 
(Prentkovskis et al. 2010a, 2010b; Skrickij, Bogdevicius 
2010; Grislis 2010; Sapragonas, Darguzis 2011). The 
present work falls into the second category, specifically 
on reducing the likelihood of collision by means of an 
emergency braking system based on vehicle to vehicle 
communications (V2V). 
Different manufacturers have installed driver as-
sistance systems in their cars to prevent accidents. In 
early 2008, Ford made public its radar technology based 
on adaptive cruise control (ACC) fitted behind the front 
grille. This system allows the driver to select one of five 
different time gaps of separation from the preceding car. 
In a parallel line of work, Toyota has developed a broad-
er-range radar sensor with an operation based on apply-
ing smooth braking or acceleration to maintain a safe 
distance up to the pre-set speed. However, these systems 
have two main drawbacks. First, those based on radar 
technology have problems with curved stretches where 
the rear end of the preceding car is lost. Second, they all 
apply smooth pressure onto the brake and throttle ped-
als, and therefore no hard braking is possible. 
Bearing this in mind, we propose V2V communi-
cation improvement to ACC systems in order to avoid 
radar failures in the curved stretches of the road, so that 
together with a specific system to permit hard braking 
when a sudden stop of the preceding car is detected. 
V2V communications for collision warning systems 
(CWS) have been developed using differential global po-
sitioning systems (DGPS) (Tan, Huang 2006). However, 
good automation of the throttle pedal, and above all -
the brake pedal, is mandatory in order to extend such 
prevention to autonomous systems capable of avoiding 
collisions. 
Assistance systems that warn the driver of immi-
nent collisions through visual or audible signals have 
been included in commercial cars in recent years. Al-
though these techniques are necessary and provide a 
warning to the driver, the dependence on human re-
action time regarding a decision to be made remains a 
problem. For this reason, our proposal involves direct 
action on car actuators. As far as the controllers are 
concerned, those associated with longitudinal control, 
in particular with the brake, bear the main responsibil-
ity for reducing the likelihood of crashes. Risk situations 
such as blind curves, crossroads with poor visibility, or 
unexpected braking of the preceding car suggest that 
an emergency system associated with the brake pedal is 
needed to avoid accidents. 
There have been various approaches to the auto-
mation of the brake pedal. Anwar (Anwar, Zheng 2007) 
describes a nonlinear sliding-mode-type controller for 
slip regulation in a braking event for a car equipped with 
an electromagnetic brake-by-wire (BBW) system. Xiang 
et al. (2008) focuses on fault tolerance design and vehi-
cle braking control schemes for electromechanical brake 
systems. Naranjo et al. (2006) uses an encoder coupled 
to a DC motor in the original circuit to obtain an auto-
matic braking system pulling on the brake pedal. Pro-
haska and Devlin (1998) uses hydro-boost power brake 
servo modified for external control. Kim et al. (1996) 
develops a fuzzy controller to actuate braking. Gerdes 
and Hedrick (1997) uses a brake vacuum booster with 
a separated actuator mounted between the booster and 
master cylinder. Finally, pneumatic braking controllers 
have been developed for other transportation vehicles 
such as buses (Bu, Tan 2007) and trains (Zhuan, Xia 
2007). 
The paper describes a control system that imple-
ments ACC fuzzy controller extension consisting of 
emergency stopping applied via an electro-hydraulic 
braking system. The autonomous system is implement-
ed as an independent braking circuit that can work in 
parallel with the original circuit. We designed a control-
ler to carry out the stopping process such that, when 
an emergency situation is detected, the controller de-
activates the fuzzy ACC controller and initiates a pre-
cision emergency stop. The least squares method used 
by other researchers (Zhou, Mahmassani 2006; Venture 
et al. 2006) is applied to experimentally determine the 
relationships between different variables of the system. 
Experiments were performed to study the behav-
iour of the system in a realistic situation, i.e. sudden, un-
expected braking of the preceding car. In urban traffic, 
this situation is the cause of many accidents either from 
colliding with other cars or hitting nearby pedestrians as 
a result of making abrupt steering manoeuvres. 
We also propose a V2V communication system 
based on broadcasting positioning information over 
WiFi. Each vehicle estimates its own position and speed 
based on the information gathered through DGPS sys-
tem, and then distributes this information to other vehi-
cles in the vicinity. The majority of communication prob-
lems associated to V2V communications are successfully 
addressed in upcoming standards IEEE 802.1 lp, Dedi-
cated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) and IEEE 
1609, including reserved frequencies, differentiation 
of traffic classes, security and multi-channel operation 
(IEEE Std 802.11:2007; IEEE P802.11p/D3.0:2007; Uz-
categui, Acosta-Marum 2009; Jiang, Delgrossi 2008). 
However, in this case, the critical nature of an emer-
gency breaking system requires the evaluation of the 
performance and reliability of 802.11 Medium Access 
Control. Based on this analysis, an ad-hoc mechanism 
is proposed to reduce failure probability to an accept-
able level. IEEE 802.1 lp behaviour has been successfully 
emulated in experiments using 802.11a PHY + 802.11e 
MAC and adjusting some MAC parameters to the ap-
propriate values. The use of the 5.8GHz band in our test 
bed assures that our results are valid for DSRC band 
(Sen, Matolak 2008; Tufail et al. 2008; Iyer et al. 2008). 
2. Equipment of the Prototype Vehicle 
This section describes the systems installed in the car. 
The vehicle is one of the fleet of AUTOPIA program 
the goals of which are to implement automatic driving 
using real, mass-produced vehicles tested on real roads 
and to develop automated systems using modular com-
ponents that can be immediately applied in automotive 
industry. 
The main sensor inputs of the system are an inertial 
measurement unit (IMU) and a high precision global 
positioning device. When using these, the system con-
trols vehicle-driving actuators, i.e. steering and throttle 
and brake pedals. The vehicle includes an on-board PC-
based computer, real-time centimetre kinematic DGPS 
(RTK-DGPS), wireless LAN support, a pulse-width 
modulation (PWM) controller to actuate the steering 
wheel, a digital/analog I/O card for controlling the throt-
tle and an electro-hydraulic system for braking. Fig. 1 
shows the structure of the control system that manages 
all these devices. 
Fig. 1. The structure of controlling AUTOPIA system 
Guidance is carried out by a cooperative system 
based on the combination of GPS positioning and an 
inertial measurement unit (IMU) plus odometer po-
sitioning in case the GPS signal is lost (Milanés et al. 
2008). This system is modelled using fuzzy variables and 
rules to follow the trajectory marked by high-precision 
digital cartography defining the target route. In addition 
to the steering wheel and vehicle speed functionalities, 
the system also considers variables that can be used for 
adaptive cruise control (ACC). 
The system is mounted on a Citroen C3 Pluriel car 
(Fig. 2) and three automatic-drive switches to activate 
controllers associated with the throttle, brake and steer-
ing wheel are installed in the dashboard. 
3. Electro-Hydraulic Braking System 
The main aim at developing the automatic braking sys-
tem was to achieve an independent braking circuit added 
onto the original circuit. Two shuttle valves are installed 
and connected to the input of the antilock braking sys-
tem (ABS) in order to keep two circuits independent. 
Each valve permits flow from either of two inlet ports to 
a common outlet by means of a free-floating metal ball 
that shuttles back-and-forth according to relative pres-
sures at two inlets. One of the inlets is connected to the 
electro-hydraulic braking system and the other one - to 
the original one. These valves allow only the input with 
larger pressure to provide supply to calipers, and thus 
permit the two braking systems to cooperate, but inde-
pendently of each other. 
The hydraulic system designed to connect to the 
shuttle valves consists of a one-litter capacity brake fluid 
tank that includes a gear pump and coupling to a 12 V 
350 W DC electric motor. In the experiment, the maxi-
mum pressure supplied by the brake pedal was meas-
ured. A pressure limiter tube set at 120 bars is installed 
in the system to avoid damage to the circuits. Two more 
valves were installed to control the system: a voltage-
controlled electro-proportional pilot regulated the ap-
plied pressure and a spool directional valve controlled 
the activation of the electro-hydraulic system by means 
of a digital signal. A schematic outline of the electro-
hydraulic system design is shown in Fig. 3. 
4. Control Architecture 
This section presents the control system to perform 
emergency braking. To this end, decision units to choose 
among different controllers in the function of traffic sit-
uations are presented. Next, a fuzzy controller to carry 
out ACC manoeuvres is shown. Finally, the emergency 
braking algorithm is described. 
4.1. Decision Unit 
The design includes three different fuzzy controllers to 
perform automatic driving (see Fig. 4). First, denomi-
nated normal driving' is designed to follow a target 
route the values of which in UTM coordinates together 
with reference speed are loaded from a database. This 
automatic mode is running when no vehicles are detect-
ed in the surrounding area. Second, denominated 'ACC 
+ stop & go driving' is capable of detecting a preceding 
car and adjusting its own speed appropriately. The third 
fuzzy controller, denominated 'overtaking', is designed 
to perform the overtaking manoeuvre on two-way roads 
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without traffic in the opposing lane. Finally, we devel-
oped a new controller, denominated emergency brak-
ing', for a special case the priority in which is avoiding 
an imminent crash. 
A decision unit is responsible for choosing an ap-
propriate controller to actuate on the throttle and brak-
ing pedals in each control cycle. This unit takes into ac-
count variables corresponding to the vehicle itself and to 
any other vehicles in the surrounding area. 
It must be emphasized that the last emergency 
braking' controller is not a fuzzy one as when it takes 
over, a high risk situation is detected. Then, the only 
action to be followed is to stop the car as soon as pos-
sible. In this case, there are two prerequisites for it to be 
activated: first, information from another car must be 
received via V2V communication; second, sharp decel-
eration together with a dangerously short distance from 
the preceding car must be detected. 
4.2. ACC Fuzzy Controller 
AUTOPIA program implemented the ACC system in 
an electric Citroen Berlingo van (Naranjo et al. 2006). 
This controller, based on fuzzy logic (Djukic et al. 2010), 
was adapted for gasoline Citroen C3 Pluriel used in the 
experiments described above. Adaptation consisted of 
modifying the linguistic values of the fuzzy rules to take 
into account the characteristics of the new vehicle. The 
time gap is the period of time that the trailing car would 
take to cover the distance from its actual position to the 
leading car's position; the derivatives of the time gap 
were used as input values. Actuation on the throttle and 
brake are generated as output values. 
Fig. 5 illustrates the behaviour of the ACC fuzzy 
controller system. The upper plot shows the speeds of 
the two cars, the black curve represents the leading ve-
hicle and the grey curve - the trailing one. The middle 
plot shows the distance separating the two cars and the 
lower plot - the acceleration of the leading car. 
During this trial, the leading vehicle was driven 
manually. This can be noted in speed fluctuations. Fol-
lowing approximately 40 s, sudden sharp deceleration is 
well accepted by the system. However, at the end, fol-
lowing 72 s, an even stronger deceleration of the leading 
vehicle due to sudden hard braking is not at all appropri-
ately responded to the system. Indeed, one observes in 
the distance plot presented in the figure that the values 
become negative, thus indicating that the trailing car 
would have crashed into the leading car. All the experi-
ments described in this paper were carried out using suf-
ficient lateral displacement between the cars to avoid an 
actual crash in case of failure. 
Hence, it is clear that the ACC system that automat-
ically reduces the speed of the car in case it is moving 
too close to the leading vehicle or increases it in case it is 
too far away is not designed to respond to abrupt chang-
es in speed. Therefore, a new robust and safe system to 
resolve this kind of circumstance should be helpful. 
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Fig. 5. ACC trial with emergency braking of the leading vehicle 
4.3. Emergency Braking Module 
This subsection presents a proposal for how to deal with 
the problem of sudden hard braking. In our opinion, 
the essential aspects of the proposal are not limited to 
ACC extension; nevertheless, the system is applicable to 
manual driving in the case that an imminent crash is 
detected. 
An emergency braking controller must compro-
mise between avoiding a collision and ensuring the 
integrity of passengers. Too sudden braking can cause 
a chain of collisions involving nearby vehicles. For this 
reason, we implemented a system based on both the dis-
tance to collision and the speed of the car. The procedure 
followed was divided into two steps. The first one was to 
experimentally determine the function: 
Braking Pressure = /(distance, speed) 
and the second - to determine the actual braking algo-
rithm. The least squares method was used for determin-
ing the functional relationship of the variables involved 
in control: distance covered, speed and braking pressure. 
The distance covered is obtained from RTK-DGPS the 
accuracy of which is around two centimetres and speed 
is taken from the CAN bus. The sampling rate is 5 Hz 
fixed by GPS. 
The relationship between the voltages applied to the 
electro-proportional pilot and pressure actually applied 
to the wheels is non-linear. Experiments were performed 
to obtain the function representing the behaviour of 
this part of the system. The experiments consisted of 
measuring the distance that the car covers for the sets 
of two fixed parameters: the initial speed set at around 
fifty kilometres per hour, speed limit in urban areas and 
braking pressure that varied in the steps of 0.5 V from 
0 V at which the pump exerts the minimal pressure on 
the wheels, to 4.5 V which corresponds to the maximum 
pressure bearable by the wheels due to the limits im-
posed by the mechanical system. The resulting ten plots 
are shown in Fig. 6. 
The maximum distance required to completely 
stop the car was 80 m and the minimum distance -
11.7 m. Tests attempting to stop the car in a distance of 
less than 11.7 m were unsuccessful because the wheels 
were blocked by the anti-lock braking system. These 
experiments yielded the relationship between the vari-
ables, and then, the least squares method was used for 
determining control surface giving pressure to apply for 
an emergency stop in critical situations. This surface 
(Fig. 7) was validated up to the limit imposed by the 
maximum braking force and minimum distance, with 
results showing the system to present good behaviour. 
The second step in implementing an emergency 
stop to avoid collisions was to apply braking force in 
real time. The system is based on the distance to the pre-
ceding car and the speed of the car. When activated, it 
determines pressure to exert on the wheels as a function 
of that distance and speed recalculating the distance and 
appropriately adjusting pressure to apply in each control 
cycle. 
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Fig. 6. Relationship between speed and braking distance for 
different values of braking pressure (in volts applied to the 
electro-proportional pilot) 
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Fig. 7. Control surface obtained applying the least 
squares method 
The activation of the braking system is based on the 
measurement of two variables: the distance between the 
cars and acceleration of the leading vehicle. The reason 
for using both these variables is that each of those is 
insufficient. For instance, sharp deceleration will not be 
dangerous if there is sufficient distance separating ve-
hicles; similarly, a short separation distance will not be 
dangerous if vehicles are moving very slowly. For the 
system to be activated the first condition is when the de-
celeration of the leading vehicle surpasses 7 m/s2 (Amo-
deo et al. 2010) - only dry asphalt is considered in this 
work. Then, if the distance falls below 15 m and results 
from adding minimum distance (11.7 m), DGPS errors 
(0.52 m), V2V maximum error (see below) at 50 km/h 
(1.06 m) and safety distance (1.72 m), emergency brake 
itself is activated. 
5. Vehicle to Vehicle Communication 
5.1. Analysis of Communication Issues 
The core of this work is the suggested emergency break-
ing system. Communications play an instrumental role 
in our research. However, due to the critical nature of 
the system proposed, we need to prove that communica-
tions give reliable support to it. As briefly explained in 
the introduction of this paper, emergent IEEE 802.1 lp, 
IEEE 1609 and DSRC standards solve several issues of 
V2V communications, including security, access differ-
entiation and a dedicated frequency band that is par-
ticularly important. However, even if a service chan-
nel is dedicated to the V2V exchange of positioning 
information, it is not obvious whether Medium Access 
Control may ensure reliable V2V communications for 
such a critical system. This section analyzes communi-
cation issues specific to our case and propose a prac-
tical solution to broadcasting information reliably. The 
only purpose of the introduced mechanism is to dem-
onstrate that IEEE 802.11 can be successfully used for 
providing reliable V2V communications as required in 
our emergency breaking system. More efficient mecha-
nisms may be suggested and better communication 
strategies must be found for a more general case when 
communication systems must be shared for other ser-
vices. However, these issues go beyond the scope of 
this work. 
V2V communications must take into account the 
dynamic nature of traffic. Relative positions, speeds and 
distances among vehicles change very fast. In such context: 
• A vehicle must know about the position and 
speed of several other vehicles in its neighbour-
hood. Hence, such information must be broad-
casted from each vehicle to all neighbours under 
a given critical distance. However, a broadcast 
packet in 802.11 will never be confirmed, and a 
vehicle never knows whether a given neighbour 
has received the packet or not. This also means 
that collisions will not be detected and auto-
matic retransmissions will never happen due to 
collisions. 
• The well-known problem of the hidden node 
will be generally present in any V2V scenario. 
Therefore, a significant probability that a vehicle 
can receive information from two neighbours 
that cannot listen to each other always exists. 
This makes useless two strategies that 802.11 
uses for reducing collision probability: physi-
cal carrier detection and NAV (network alloca-
tion vector) used in combination with RTS/CTS 
mechanism. 
• Control cycles in all vehicles at a given area re-
ceive positioning information from satellites 
simultaneously through their DGPS systems, 
hence causing implicitly a high level of synchro-
nization. In such conditions, broadcasting pack-
ets as soon as a vehicle extracts information from 
the DGPS system would imply an extremely high 
probability of collision. In order to lower colli-
sion probability, the instant chosen for transmit-
ting broadcast packets within control cycle must 
be stochastic. 
• For a number of vehicles in the vicinity as high 
as N=40, even with previous consideration, the 
collision probability of a single broadcast packet 
would be higher than p>0.02, which would be 
unacceptable for service as critical as an emer-
gency breaking system. 
5.2. Reliability of the V2V Communications System 
The obvious consequence of the previous considerations 
is the need of transmitting several broadcast packets per 
control cycle from each vehicle, choosing stochastically 
the instants of transmission and updating the informa-
tion contained in each packet as much as possible be-
cause nobody knows what packets will be successfully 
received and what will collide. Next, we need to find out 
the optimal value of the number of packets transmitted 
per control cycle, the lowest error probability and the 
exact mechanism for its implementation. 
The proposed scheme is built on the top of custom 
IEEE 802.11e cards working in the band of 5.8 GHz. The 
cards and drivers have not been modified at all apart 
from some variable MAC parameters that are adjusted 
following the values displayed in Table 1 and recommen-
dations of IEEE 1609.4 standard for the major priority 
service class. The proposed broadcasting scheme is pro-
grammed on the top of the driver as a user-space pro-
gram. All vehicles obtain information on precise posi-
tioning through DGPS and broadcast it several times per 
control cycle. The description of this mechanism follows. 
Collision probability may be dramatically improved only 
by slotting the channel, which is especially easy in our 
case because the size of all the packets exchanged by our 
system will have a constant well-known size. The recep-
tion of DGPS information determines the starting point 
of control cycles in all vehicles. A control cycle is divided 
into K high-level slots so that transmissions can only 
happen at the beginning of any slot. In such conditions, 
if slot duration is long enough to contain the complete 
transmission of a packet plus round-trip propagation 
time to the farthest station in our communication range, 
collision probability will be minimized. 
The proposed broadcast packet contains four fields: 
time-stamp, UTM latitude, UTM longitude and speed 
implemented as one unsigned long integer of 4 bytes, 
two double real numbers of 8 bytes each and one 'float' 
of 4 bytes respectively, totalling 24 bytes. We will work 
at a fixed speed of 6 Mbps. The obtained results could be 
improved by working at higher speeds in case of favour-
able conditions for channel propagation. The values of 
different parameters that must be considered in calcula-
tions are included in Table 1. 
It should be noticed that a 160 us high-level slot 
size accomplishes the condition given to optimize col-
lision probability under our conditions. Thus, by divid-
ing control cycle in 1250 slots at the control level and 
imposing that packets are transmitted stochastically at 
the beginning of any high-level slot, we will have the 
lowest possible collision probability. The IEEE 802.11 
contention window would never be used in our scenario 
because the channel would always be free at the begin-
ning of a high-level slot. If traffic is present in the same 
band from other sources, more accurate analysis should 
be performed. 
Table 1. Medium access control parameters used in 
calculations and experiments. IEEE 802.11a has been used 
and considered for compatibility with available experimental 
materials, but adjustments to IEEE 802.lip would 
be insignificant 
SIFS 
Bitrate 
SlotTime 
DIFS 
Round-trip propagation time 
PLCP Overhead (preamble and header) 
MAC Overhead (header) 
Payload 
Total packet duration 
DIFS+broadcast 
Control cycle 
Proposed high-level slot size 
Number of high-level slots per control cycle 
16 |is 
6 Mbps 
9 |is 
34|is 
2 |is 
52 |is 
37.33 |is 
32 |is 
121.67 |is 
157.33 
200 ms 
160 |is 
1250 
A total number of m broadcast packets will be sent 
per control cycle. It has already been mentioned that 
m=\ would give a very poor result. As we increase m, 
one can suspect that the probability of one of the pack-
ets to be successfully received by a neighbour station is 
initially increased. It is also straightforward to see that 
an extremely high value of m would be also subopti-
mal. Hence, the optimal value of m that minimizes error 
probability must be found. Note that the correct trans-
mission and reception of at least one packet per control 
cycle will be considered success; even though (m-1) oth-
er packets in the same control cycle may have collided. 
Consequently, we define the probability of failure (Pf) 
as the probability of all m packets broadcasted during 
control cycle to collide. 
We have defined K as the number of high-level slots 
in control cycle. We are proposing that variable to have 
constant value i>C=1250, but keep it in the analytical ex-
pressions to make our analysis as general as possible, m 
packets are sent in randomly chosen slots. The slot for 
the first transmission is chosen within K possible slots 
using a uniform random variable; then the slot for the 
second transmission will be chosen within K-1 free slots 
using the same procedure etc. 
The probability of a vehicle transmitting a packet at 
any given high-level slot is given in Equation 1: 
The conditional probability of the collision of any 
packet supposing that it has already been transmitted 
would be given by Equation 2: 
p = l-(l-z)N-\ (2) 
Hence, the probability of communication failure in 
control cycle corresponds to the probability of the colli-
sion of m packets and is provided in Equation 3: 
p/=r=(i-(i-xri)m. o) 
Failure probability in one cycle (Pf) is represented 
in Fig. 8 and that during two consecutive control cycles 
is shown in Fig. 9. Due to high collision probability, we 
consider that error probability due to propagation issues 
can be neglected. 
Fig. 10 represents the optimum value of m that 
minimizes the probability of failure depending on the 
number of vehicles within the communication range. 
Table 2 gives optimal m, Pp Pf2 (probability of fail-
1.00E+000-r 
1.00E-014 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425 
m (number of broadcasts per control cycle) 
Fig. 8. The probability of communication failure 
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Fig. 9. The probability of communication failure 
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Table 2. Failure probability of the communication system 
and medium time between failures 
Number of 
neighbour 
vehicles 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
m that 
minimizes 
Pf 
43 
22 
14 
11 
9 
Minimum 
Pf 
3.29-10-14 
2.35-10-7 
4.04-10-5 
5.16-10-4 
2.38-10-3 
Minimum 
Pf2 
1.08-10-27 
5.52-10-14 
1.63-10-9 
2.66-10~7 
5.66-10-6 
MTBF (h) 
5.13-1022 
1.01-109 
3.40-104 
2.09-102 
9.81 
ure in two consecutive control cycles) as well as MTBF 
(Mean Time Between Failures) calculated taking into 
account the probability of failure in two consecutive 
control cycles. 
Failure probability that is lower than 1CT6 per con-
trol cycle can be achieved for less than 45 vehicles within 
the range of communication. When doubling the num-
ber of vehicles, failure probability for two consecutive 
control cycles would be the same. On the other hand, 
distances among vehicles are naturally increased as 
speed becomes higher, which means that the system will 
be more reliable at higher speeds because the maximum 
number of vehicles within the range of communications 
will be lower. In order to estimate if those failure prob-
abilities are low or high, one must think that communi-
cation failure will have a real impact only if: 
• it affects the reception of positioning information 
from the immediate preceding vehicles; 
• it happens when a sudden deceleration occurs in 
those vehicles. 
The joint probability of those three events is practi-
cally equal to null. However, the system can determine 
when failure is likely to happen by computing the num-
ber of detected collisions. In that case, alert can be is-
sued to the driver to inform that the system is temporar-
ily unreliable 
In any real scenario, for optimal results, the num-
ber of neighbours vehicles that can be detected should 
be kept under forty (Ak40). A very simple collaborative 
strategy to achieve the required result is the adaptation 
of transmission power depending on the number of ve-
hicles detected during one or two control cycles. 
The number of broadcast packets may also be ad-
justed to its optimal value dynamically depending on the 
number of neighbours vehicles detected. 
5.3. Implementing a Subsystem of Communications 
The control cycle of the system has a 200 ms period that 
starts when the DGPS system provides updated infor-
mation about position, speed and time. The initial error 
of that information is lower than 50 cm, which is fairly 
good for our purposes. However, we intend to send m 
broadcast packets containing that information during 
control cycle. Speed information may be updated eve-
ry 40 ms along with data obtained from the CAN bus. 
Time can also be updated for each packet using system 
clock. The position can be estimated using time, position 
and speed at the beginning of control cycle and updated 
time and speed. Each of m broadcast packets in control 
cycle is supposed to contain updated information, not 
only a copy of the first version. 
Initially m = 20, and transmission power will be 
set to maximum. Control cycle will take the following 
actions concerning V2V communications: 
A. - Transmitting thread: 
1. Data is read from the DGPS system and 5 vari-
ables are initialized: Timestamp, UTM_North, 
UTM_East, Speed and Direction. 
2. Instants for starting broadcast transmission with-
in control cycle are calculated as follows: m inde-
pendent values are taken from stochastic variable 
X=(7[0,l] , giving values in increasing order to 
Xj, ..., Xm. Instants for m transmissions will be: 
Time¡ [us] = Timestamp [us] + 160-znf(X,-1250). 
3. Round = 1. Time0=Timestamp. 
4. Pause until TimeRound. 
5. If int (TimeRound_Timestamp)/40000 > 
{Time-n^n^—Timestamp)/40000, then speed is 
updated by reading information taken from the 
CAN bus. All fields in the next packet are up-
dated consequently. 
6. The broadcast packet is composed and sent at 
instant TimeRound. 
7. Round = Round + 1. If Round < m+\ then go 
to 4. 
B. - Receiving thread: 
1. Depending on the speed of the vehicle, variable 
D is set up to the distance required by the vehi-
cle to stop completely. Variable E is set up to an 
increment in the distance considered necessary 
to be added to D in order to account for the po-
sitioning error. 
2. Packets are received at wireless interface. If a 
packet is the first one from a given station at this 
control cycle, the registry of that station is up-
dated. If a packet is received from the station that 
already has sent the packet in this control cycle, 
it is thrown away. 
3. When updated registry corresponds to a preced-
ing vehicle, is received and if: 
• deceleration is higher than 7 m/s2 ; 
• distance to our vehicle is less than D+E+DGPS 
error+safety distance (<15 m); 
• the emergency breaking system is activated to 
stop the vehicle. 
4. At the end of control cycle: 
• registries corresponding to the stations from 
which no packets have been received in the last 
three control cycles are erased; 
• the number of registries is counted and as-
signed to variable N; 
• if N > 40, then transmission power is reduced 
to 3 dBm. 
• m is adjusted to the optimal value for N. 
5. Go to 1. 
Considering that any packet received from the 
neighbours vehicle may contain positioning information 
with an error due to DGPS error plus an offset due to 
the estimation of updated position, Table 3 shows maxi-
mum positioning errors at different speeds 
Table 3. Speed, distance covered and error in position 
Speed 
(km/h) 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
70 
90 
120 
Speed 
(m/s) 
2.78 
5.56 
8.33 
11.11 
13.89 
19.44 
25.00 
33.33 
Distance Covered 
in 40 ms 
0.11 
0.22 
0.33 
0.44 
0.56 
0.78 
1.00 
1.33 
Maximum error 
in position (E) 
0.61 
0.72 
0.83 
0.94 
1.06 
1.28 
1.50 
1.83 
The vehicle has to know maximum distance re-
quired to stop the vehicle (D) at a given speed and 
maximum error in position (E). When using this infor-
mation, the previous algorithm stops the vehicle with-
out collision as soon as a preceding vehicle reduces too 
abruptly its distance to our vehicle and its speed. 
The V2V communication system has been widely 
tested in many trials in CAR facilities with only two ve-
hicles. The presence of a packet injector in the scenario 
represents the effect of traffic generated by other con-
tending vehicles. During these trials, the worst case of 
communication failure detected was the loss of signal 
during one control cycle. 
6. Experimental Results 
Various trials were performed to test the behaviour of 
the system. Fig. 11 shows a plan view of the private 
driving circuit at CAR facilities. This circuit represents 
an urban area with a combination of straight-road seg-
ments, bends and 90° crossroads. The main aim of the 
present trials was to test the behaviour of the emergency 
braking system. The route selected to carry them out is 
marked in the figure. During the first four stretches, the 
autonomous car was performing ACC. The upper part of 
the circuit was used for the braking test. It consists of a 
Fig. 11. Private driving circuit in CAR facilities 
straight 250 m stretch of the road, the last part (marked 
on the image) of which has a 3% downwards slope. We 
used this area for checking the system under the most 
unfavourable conditions of the circuit. 
Two experiments will be described in detail. The 
first one was carried out with only one occupant in the 
car. It was made to check the behaviour of the system 
in case of losing the precision of the GPS signal - when 
IMU replaces GPS to determine a position. The sec-
ond experiment was made with five occupants, so as to 
check the behaviour of the system in situations of differ-
ent dynamics. The speed during these trials was around 
50 km/h. The system was validated for speeds up to 55 
km/h because limitations on the circuit hindered from 
testing at higher speeds. 
During these trials, the car was driven automatically 
to reduce human influence. It was accelerated from the 
starting point. When the car used to detect the manually 
driven preceding car, its speed was adapted until reach-
ing the braking area where the preceding car executed a 
hard braking manoeuvre in order to test the operation 
of the new system. The preceding car was equipped with 
DGPS with the accuracy of up to 50 cm while the au-
tonomous car was equipped with the RTK-DGPS system 
with the accuracy of up to 2 cm in order to achieve the 
best precision for graphical results. The proposed V2V 
communication system was implemented and used in 
the cars. Communication systems were Proxim Orino-
co Gold cards working at the 5.8 GHz band. The com-
munication system itself was not stressed due to a low 
number of vehicles involved in the experiments. Hence, 
communications performed transparently as expected. 
The goal of the first trial was to test the behaviour 
of our system when the failure of GPS occurred. To this 
end, software was modified to activate the IMU system 
even without the loss of GPS signal quality. In that way, 
we were able to compare the distance between the vehi-
cles from GPS data with the positions generated by the 
IMU system. 
Fig. 12 shows experimental results with one occu-
pant in the car and a failure in GPS positioning. The top 
graph shows the speed of the leading (black) and trailing 
(grey) cars. The next one depicts the distance between 
cars - the black line shows the actual distance measured 
by GPS while the grey one indicates the distance when 
the position of the trailing car is generated by IMU. The 
following graph points to the acceleration of the leading 
car. These two values are input conditions needed to ac-
tivate emergency braking. The bottom graph shows the 
value of the driving state variable (top black line) that 
selects different driving controllers the possible value of 
which are 0 for normal driving, 1 for ACC+Stop&Go 
driving, 2 for overtaking, and 3 for emergency braking. 
In these experiments, only ACC+Stop&Go driving and 
emergency braking are selected. The figure also shows 
the value of the threshold variable (bottom grey line) 
the values of which are 0 for normal state, - 1 for the 
first trigger condition that the emergency stop has been 
satisfied (acceleration greater than - 7m/s2) and - 2 in-
dicates that both conditions (acceleration and distance) 
have been satisfied. 
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Fig. 12. Emergency braking experiment with one occupant and the IMU system 
Initially, an autonomous vehicle follows the other 
one in the ACC+Stop&Go driving state along the circuit 
depicted in Fig. 11. During the first 60 s, the leading 
vehicle modifies its speed smoothly as shown in the ac-
celeration graph. Next, following 63 s, the driver of the 
leading car executes a hard braking manoeuvre for more 
than 2 s with deceleration values greater than 7 m/s2 and 
a peak deceleration of 8.61 m/s2. At this moment, the au-
tonomous car is still in the ACC+Stop&Go driving state. 
Changes in the threshold variable are shown at the 
bottom part of Fig. 12. One observes that acceleration 
condition is fulfilled just before second 64, but the dis-
tance is then still greater than 15 m. Soon after second 
66, the distance is reduced to less than this value, and 
then the threshold value changes to - 2 thus triggering 
emergency brake. Therefore, the driving state value be-
comes 3. The emergency brake system was activated and 
the trailing vehicle decelerated from 50 km/h to zero in 
15 m. 
Since inertial systems are dead-reckoning systems, 
their accuracy degrades with time. For instance, the use 
of inertial units causes the distance to be slightly greater 
than in reality so that the trigger of emergency brake is 
activated slightly earlier. The final gap between the cars 
measured by the IMU system was 84 cm, though the 
actual distance measured by GPS made 1.16 m. 
The degradation of positioning based on the IMU 
system is acceptable up to five minutes (Milanés et al. 
2008), after which it becomes too large to be useful. In 
this trial, the duration of GPS outage was around 80 
seconds. 
The second trial consisted of repeating the same 
route but had five occupants in the autonomous car 
which was so as to assess the influence of the mass on 
the system. The results are shown in Fig. 13. In this case, 
the gap when the vehicles had finally stopped was 74 cm. 
To sum up, the conducted tests under unfavour-
able conditions of slope, positioning and load showed 
the system to present good behaviour. 
We have only described one trial of each kind in 
unfavourable conditions. However, many different tri-
als were actually carried out, and in all cases, the final 
distance between vehicles was less than 75 cm when GPS 
was working at its top precision, and 1.25 m in the case 
of GPS outage. Given that the manually driven car had 
DGPS with an associated error of around 50 cm, the 
obtained results show the good behaviour of the system. 
7. Appraisal 
The proposed system focuses on emergency braking 
based on V2V communications in urban environments 
(speeds up to 50 km/h). Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
in order to develop a commercial system, a new variable 
would have to be introduced: deceleration and its value 
would have to depend on the road surface and meteoro-
logical conditions. 
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Fig. 13. Emergency braking experiment with five occupants 
Everything this paper deals with is closely related to 
conditions on the road, namely, the friction coefficient 
between the tire and the road. There are many studies 
concerning this subject. Table 4 taken from (Wong 2008) 
shows friction coefficients taking into account the func-
tion of the surface. A new column has been added to 
show deceleration values in each one of these surfaces. 
As far as this work aims, only asphalt dry conditions 
have to be considered (deceleration higher than 7 m/s2). 
In order to improve the proposed system, a differ-
ent coefficient would have to be selected according to 
Table 4. Speed, distance covered and error in position 
Surface 
Asphalt and 
concrete (dry) 
Asphalt (wet) 
Concrete (wet) 
Gravel 
Earth road (dry) 
Earth road (wet) 
Snow (hard-packed) 
Ice 
Peak Value 
Up 
0.80^0.90 
0.50^0.70 
0.80 
0.60 
0.68 
0.55 
0.20 
0.10 
Sliding 
Value |i s 
0.75 
0.45^0.60 
0.70 
0.55 
0.65 
0.40^0.50 
0.15 
0.07 
Peak 
Acceleration 
(m/s2) 
7.84^8.82 
5.39^6.86 
8.84 
5.88 
6.66 
5.39 
1.96 
0.98 
weather conditions. It could be obtained from the CAN 
bus, i.e. using information coming from windshield wip-
ers for rain conditions. 
In brief, the proposed system achieves the initial 
goals but further work is necessary if a robust commer-
cial system is to be obtained. V2V communications have 
been deeply discussed. Next steps in road conditions 
and its effects on the proposed algorithm - both trigger 
and controller - have to be acknowledged. 
8. Conclusions 
1. A system based on V2V communication and electro-
hydraulic braking to take over control of the car in the 
case of an unexpected situation has been presented. 
This system has been incorporated into the architec-
ture of AUTOPIA autonomous driving control. DGPS 
signal was used for determining distances between 
cars, and the method of precise stopping was designed 
and implemented to stop the car before a collision 
could occur. The system was designed to have colli-
sion avoidance as its primary target. 
2. Different experimental trials were performed to check 
the behaviour of the system giving good results. The 
errors obtained were less than 1.25 m under really 
unfavourable conditions, showing that such design 
is a hopeful starting point for developing automatic 
devices that will act on the cars independently of the 
driver when a possible accident is detected by some 
means and all warnings have failed to produce drivers 
response. 
3. As works for the future, effects on changes under road 
conditions have to be considered. They affect both the 
trigger system - deceleration values lower than 7 m/s2 
have to be considered - and the controller. The pro-
posed algorithm will have to take into account DGPS 
error, communication failures and delays and a new 
variable that is the effect of the road adhesion coef-
ficient. 
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